The book, by Michael Lewis, is very good at detailing the situations and characters involved in the financial mess caused by the recent housing bubble and how a few people anticipated it and bet big on it happening.
The book starts with a quote by Tolstoy about the importance of being open-minded in order to understand complex things and being close-minded keeps someone from understanding even simple things. The author was amazed how in the mid 1980's, Salomon Bros. would pay him good money, a 24 y.o. with no clue. Yet, he figured out then that the big money was made in the bond market not stocks, leading up to the junk bond collapse in the 80s. He then wrote about it, and here it was essentially happening all over again with the bond people. CEO's knew nothing of the risks their bond traders were taking. He hoped bright college students would avoid Wall Street, rebel against it and just pursue what they loved. But, no, the financial system would again be discredited. He then goes into these key things in this mess like:
1. Meredith Whitney, then an obscure analyst at Oppenheimer & Co, with just a BA from Brown who studied English, said Citicorp was so mismanaged it would cut its dividend or go bust. The so-called experts were still not acknowledging the risk in the sub-prime mortgage market - not that they were corrupt, just stupid. She was trained by Steve Eisman who also gave her a world view - how to see the big picture when analyzing stuff. She read about John Paulson, a hedge fund manager, who made big bets against the bonds and there were a few others. Eisman, U. Penn and Harvard, but also yeshiva trained and loved the Talmud because of its contradictions - he had the mind set to look for investment contradictions. He saw Wall Street going where it never went before - into the debts of ordinary Americans - cash flow from pools of mortgages - the only risk back then was of borrowers paying off soon, but never not at all. So, this new market, never really tapped into to such an extent, homes, and let less credit-worthy people to buy homes, but the real risk was in letting them cash out and refinance to get more money, basically a fast buck business with the issuers of the mortgages just selling them off and not caring what happened long term. Society had changed, with incomes more skewed, more wealthy and more struggling - so this was a way to let those left behind in the economy to prosper, even feel wealthy - letting them borrow easily. Oppenheimer was getting into this new market. Eisman needed Vincent Daniel, from Queens and SUNY Binghamton whose father was murdered - so different roots, to parse data. Found that delinquency rates were hidden, only profits from prepayments were visible.
2. 1997 Russia defaulted, 2002 Eisman saw HFC was a fraud - tricking customers on interest rates, Eisman was aware of ACORN -was a Republican until he saw an entire industry, consumer finance, existed just to rip people off.
3. By 2005, 75% subprime loans were floating rate, fixed for just 2 years. Long Beach Savings was the first to get into this, soon followed by big WS banks - run by the bond departments.
4. In 2004, Michael Burry got into them, seeing decline in lending standards, but hard to short, then he discovered Credit Default Swaps (CDSs). Charlie Munger gave lecture about the "psychology of human misjudgment."
5. 2ndQ 2005, credit card delinquencies at all-time high, but home prices continued going up. Hallmark of a bubble/mania/fraud.
6. AIG on the other side of the bet, issuing the CDSs. Goldman created the CDO and synthetic CDOs which had in them CDSs. Home prices didn't need to fall, just not go up as fast. Tom Fewings, the first in AIG to spot trouble - when seeing WSJ article on New Century. Joe Cassano, head of AIG FP didn't think home prices would fall, at least not nationally, all at once - eventually did change his mind, but still exposed. Mid 2006 home prices began to fall.
7. FICO scores had blind spots - didn't acct. for people's income, could be rigged by getting a new credit card and paying off right away, no differerence between "thin file" and "thick file" borrowers, teaser rates hid risks, averages were used for pools of mortgages which hid the amount of low FICO scores of those who should never have been given mortgages, "silent seconds" allowing borrowers to have no equity in their home.
8. Few used CDSs as outright bets against housing, most were used as hedges while still hoping for the bonds to work out. Exceptions were those who listened to Greg Lippman's pitch, like John Paulson. Paulson/Eisman/Burry understood the risk. Ledley/Hockett/Mai just bet on the least likely possibility - their strategy. Rule of thumb - buy homes when price equal or less than 10X rent and sell when 20X.
9. Names and acronyms hid risks - CDOs not called subprime backed CDOs, but structured finance CDOs, RMBS, HEL, HELOC, ALT-As were just no-doc crappy loans, Rockridge community not called Oakland so homes would sell for more. Actually, 80% of a CDO was overrated, so even better to bet against the higher tranches, since the CDS would be cheaper but the same likelihood of default.
10. Wing Chao, called a CDO manager, which were essentially front men for WS firms, could collect bigger salaries and imply they actually studied the CDOs.
11. Rating agency people were underpaid- should have been paid more to attract talented people - they just made their money by collecting fees for each rating, so just pushed them through quickly. Like a Ponzi scheme - more morons than crooks, but the crooks were higher up. WS just propped up CDO prices while it could - fraud was rampant - neither the WSJ nor SEC was interested.
12. Now Bear Stearns at risk. Merrill had advised Orange county before their bankruptcy, was in the middle of the Internet bust, 80's bond market bust, so naturally they would be in the middle of this.
13. Jim Grant couldn't figure out CDOs then realized that was the story to be told.
14. When Goldman got into the bet against CDOs, then CDOs began to tank. 4/2007 New Century went bankrupt. BS leverage 40:1,Lehman & ML 32:1, Morgan Stanley & Citicorp 33:1, GS 25:1. Only a slight decline could bankrupt them all. 9/2008 Lehman went bankrupt, ML $55B loss - sold to BA. WS firms were the dumb money, CEOs stupid. Bear Stearns Chioffi and Tannin arrested.
!5. It was greed, sure, but more the incentives which channeled the greed. Then, the people who didn't see it happening were the ones to clean it up - H. Paulson, Geithner, Bernanke,etc. Then H. Paulson engineered the $700B bailout of the worst culprits.
An important book, the only criticism I have is that it could have been shorter, but I guess the author did want it to read like a story and illuminate some specific personalities, which will probably make the book easier to make into a movie.
4 out of 5 stars.
